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By Wendy C. Gerzog
In Koons,1 the Tax Court denied an interest de-
duction on a loan made by the decedent’s family
limited liability company to the decedent’s revo-
cable trust, and it determined the value of the trust’s
interest in that LLC at the decedent’s death.
At his death on March 3, 2005, the decedent had
four children from his first marriage, seven grand-
children, and two former wives. Following in his
father’s footsteps, the decedent invested heavily
and worked in Burger Brewing Co., ultimately
becoming president and CEO. That company be-
came Central Investment Corp. (CIC) and changed
its products and activities to Pepsi bottling and
distribution and vending machines.
Beginning in the late 1990s, PepsiCo Inc. (Pepsi)
and CIC were involved in litigation over CIC’s
exclusive right to sell Pepsi syrup to various busi-
nesses in CIC’s geographical area. During 2004, CIC
and PepsiAmericas Inc. (PAS), a Pepsi affiliate,
agreed that CIC would sell its soda and vending
machine enterprise to PAS. Before that sale, CIC
transferred its assets not covered by the agreement
to its newly formed wholly owned subsidiary, Cen-
tral Investment LLC (CI LLC). That asset transfer
was completed between October 1, 2004, and Janu-
ary 9, 2005.
On December 15, 2004, the parties (PAS, CIC
stockholders, CIC, CI LLC, and a short-lived hold-
ing company created for the sole purpose of trans-
acting the sale) signed a stock purchase agreement.
On that date, the decedent owned 46.9 percent of
CIC’s voting stock and 51.5 percent of its nonvoting
common stock. His children also owned CIC shares.
Using the holding company, the stock purchase
agreement required all CIC shares to be sold to PAS
for $340 million2 at closing. Although not in the
written contract, it was stipulated to the court that
Pepsi paid $50 million, which CIC had agreed to
contribute to CI LLC, to settle the litigation.3 The
children’s sale agreement was subject to CI LLC’s
agreement to redeem their shares in the LLC. CI
LLC’s December 21, 2004, redemption offer con-
tained many conditional provisions, including
those concerning the determination of price.4
The stock purchase agreement closed on January
10, 2005, and two days later the holding company
merged and dissolved into CI LLC. CI LLC then
owned the PAS sales proceeds, the litigation settle-
ment award, and the non-soda and non-vending
machine assets of CIC.5 CI LLC was, however,
under the stock purchase agreement, subject to
obligations until January 10, 2012, that required the
LLC to ‘‘own directly at all times cash, cash equiva-
lents or marketable securities with an aggregate fair
market value of at least $10 million’’ and to keep a
minimum net worth of $40 million.
CI LLC’s amended operating agreement required
that it make distributions to satisfy members’ tax
liabilities6 for LLC profits. It also required permis-
sion to make discretionary cash distributions to
members, to transfer their interests to the de-
cedent’s ‘‘direct lineal descendants,’’ and, by a
minimum 75 percent members’ vote, to transfer
interests to others.
1Estate of Koons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-94.
2Under the stock purchase agreement, the $340 million
would also include a working capital adjustment so that the
actual sale price was approximately $352.4 million.
3Unwritten, agreed-on transfers occurred on January 7, 2005.
4The four children redeemed their interests in CI LLC
separately in 2005 on January 24, January 27, February 22, and
February 27.
5Among the transferred assets was a health fitness club
owned by CIC since 1987.
6On February 27, 2006, CI LLC’s operating agreement was
further amended to cover not only federal and state taxes but
also local taxes.
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On January 7, 2005, the decedent took out a
two-week loan for $30 million and timely repaid it.
On the day he repaid that loan, he also lent CI LLC
$20 million for three years at 3.5 percent interest (CI
LLC repaid the loan in full by September 30, 2005).7
Also on January 7, CI LLC distributed $100 million
pro rata to its members, including approximately
$29.6 million to the decedent’s children that re-
duced their redemption payments under their re-
demption offers from the LLC. Apart from the $100
million distribution, CI LLC paid $90,700,169 in the
redemption.
On February 4, 2005, the decedent amended his
1989 revocable trust,8 after which his children were
removed as beneficiaries and replaced by the de-
cedent’s ‘‘grandchildren, the lineal descendants of
Koons’ grandchildren, and the surviving spouses of
either group.’’ Six days later, the decedent contrib-
uted his CI LLC interest to his revocable trust. As of
his February 16, 2005, amendments to the trust, if
the decedent revoked the trust, its assets reverted to
him. The trustees had the right to borrow funds for
any purpose. As the decedent directed in writing to
the trustees, he would receive the trust’s income. He
had the right to direct the trustees how to exercise
the trust’s CI LLC voting powers and how to
dispose of its CI LLC interest. After the decedent’s
death, the trustees were required, as requested, to
pay the decedent’s executor for estate taxes, ex-
penses, bequests, and obligations other than non-
contractual claims. Thereafter, the trust would
continue in perpetuity, with the trustees paying
discretionary amounts of income and principal to
the beneficiaries. No descendant of the decedent
could be a replacement trustee.
On February 18, 2005, the decedent in writing
directed the trustees to vote his trust’s CI LLC
interest to amend the LLC’s operating agreement to
(1) eliminate his children as permitted transferees of
membership interests; (2) eliminate the board of
advisers (which included the decedent’s children);
and (3) for the first 15 years of CI LLC’s operations,
limit discretionary distributions per year to 30 per-
cent of the excess of distributable cash over income
tax distributions made under section 3.4 of the
operating agreement.9
Three days later, the decedent’s eldest child,
James, wrote to his father,10 describing the redemp-
tion offer as ‘‘punitive’’ but thanking him for the
‘‘exit vehicle’’ and acknowledging that his siblings
would ‘‘like to be gone.’’ James envisioned that the
LLC’s board of managers would buy operating
companies11 instead of passive investments, which
he considered more advisable. He also foresaw
what he considered inevitable litigation when the
board began to make its decisions for the LLC’s
benefit rather than the family’s benefit. A few days
before his death, the decedent answered James’s
letter, saying he would look into his suggestions
and would notify him if he decided to adopt any of
them.12
At Koons’s death, the net value of CI LLC was
$317,909,786, and its assets included $322,117,296 in
cash. After completion of the redemption on April
30, 2005, the decedent’s revocable trust owned 70.93
percent of CI LLC and, on February 27, 2006, the
estate’s assets apart from the revocable trust had a
total value of $26,651,426, including liquid assets
amounting to $19,192,791.13
One year after Koons’s death, his nephew sued
all CI LLC members on the ground that the dece-
dent had breached his fiduciary duties in 1984 as
trustee of the nephew’s immediate family trust. The
suit was dismissed June 4, 2009, as time barred. On
February 22, 2007, the decedent’s grandchildren
asked the LLC to redeem their present interests at
book value, but on April 26, 2007, the LLC declined
their request.
The estate claimed an interest deduction for
$71,419,497 on the decedent’s estate tax return.
7On February 25, 2005, the decedent transferred 55 percent of
the payments under this loan ‘‘to the trustees of the J.F. Koons III
Supplemental Revocable Trust dated 2/16/2005 and 5 percent
of the payments to the trustee of the J.F. Koons III Revocable
Trust for the benefit of Mary Jane Mitchell and John H. Mitchell
dated 2/16/2005.’’
8On July 20, 2004, the decedent executed his will, which
designated his revocable trust as the residuary beneficiary of his
estate.
9On March 1, 2005, the LLC’s operating agreement was
amended to limit discretionary distributions with that restric-
tion. Effective June 29 of that year, the agreement was amended
to prohibit transfers of LLC interests to the decedent’s children.
10James e-mailed a copy to his siblings.
11In December 2005 CI LLC purchased a wood pallet recy-
cling business for about $2.85 million. In September 2008 the
LLC sold most of the assets of that business. In August 2006 the
LLC bought CK Products, another operating company, for about
$7.3 million, but those were the only two operating companies
it had acquired.
12At Koons’s death, CI LLC employed 40 persons in various
positions, as required and paid for by the stock purchase
agreement.
13The trust owned a 70.42 percent voting interest in the LLC
and a 71.07 nonvoting interest. In 2009 the LLC’s subsidiaries
had a positive cash flow and distributed about $1.3 million to
the LLC.
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Apart from the CI LLC interests owned by the
decedent’s revocable trust, the estate possessed
about $19 million in liquid assets on February 27,
2006, when the estate tax liability amounted to
about $21 million and the trust had a $21 million
generation-skipping transfer tax as self-assessed,
respectively, on those returns.14 On February 28,
2006, CI LLC made a $10.75 million loan to the
decedent’s revocable trust to pay the estate and gift
tax liabilities. The loan had an interest rate of 9.5
percent and was repayable in 14 annual payments
of about $5.9 million, beginning in 2024 and ending
in 2031, with no prepayment allowed. The total
interest element was $71,419,497. The trust’s main
asset was its CI LLC interest, which held more than
$200 million in highly liquid assets.15
Explaining the requirements of an interest deduc-
tion under section 2053, the Tax Court cited the
regulation that says administrative expenses must
be ‘‘necessarily incurred’’ and ‘‘essential to the
proper administration of the estate.’’16 For interest
payments, the loan must be necessary to avoid
liquidating assets at less than FMV. Under that
criteria and based on its findings, the court denied
the interest deduction. The court found that the
revocable trust did not need to take out a loan for
$10.75 million to pay taxes since it owned more than
70 percent of CI LLC, which had available many
times the liquid assets necessary to satisfy the
liabilities. It also noted that the trust could force the
LLC to distribute its assets.
The court rejected the taxpayers’ argument that
the loan was better than a cash distribution because
the latter would have made it more difficult for the
LLC to purchase businesses. The court said that the
loan itself removed the same amount of cash from
the LLC, that cash distributions were necessary for
the trust to repay the loan, and that keeping the
estate open for up to 25 years after Koons’s death
for the loan repayment was contrary to proper
administration of the estate.
Next, the court considered the value of the revo-
cable trust’s interest in CI LLC at the decedent’s
death when the LLC had a net value of $317,909,786
and when the trust owned a 50.5 percent interest in
the LLC. Multiplying those two figures, the court
found the pro rata asset value to equal $160,544,442.
The parties disagreed on the proper lack of market-
ability discount. The taxpayers argued for a 31.7
percent discount, and the government argued for a
7.5 percent discount.17
The taxpayers’ expert, whose report to the court
had figures different from those submitted for the
estate tax return, rejected the application of a con-
trol premium because the revocable trust’s voting
interest was only 46.94 percent.18 Basing his values
on his 2001 regression study of 88 companies, the
expert assigned values to the equation, resulting in
the calculation of a 26.6 percent discount. From that
figure, he adjusted for differences between the LLC
and the companies in the study. He applied an
additional 4 percent discount because of the unique
restrictions and liabilities of the LLC and an addi-
tional 3 percent discount because (1) CI LLC was a
closely held, small, unknown LLC; and (2) a 75
percent vote of the members was required for an
interest in CI LLC to be sold to anyone who was not
a direct descendant.
The government’s expert agreed that no control
premium should be applied, although he consid-
ered it likely that the redemptions would take place.
That was because he also thought that with the
main LLC assets consisting of cash as opposed to a
business, it was unlikely a controlling LLC interest
would sell for more than its proportional net asset
value. The expert, however, said he believed that a
small discount of between 5 and 10 percent should
be applied because (1) there was little risk that the
redemption would not occur; (2) the LLC had
obligations under the stock purchase agreement; (3)
the LLC was likely to make cash distributions; (4)
the LLC had transfer restrictions; (5) the trust was
able to force distributions from the LLC after the
redemptions; and (6) and the LLC’s assets were
predominantly liquid.
The court determined that the major difference
between the two marketability discount figures was
each expert’s assumption of the likelihood of the
redemption of the children’s interests in CI LLC.
Because the court considered it highly probable that
the redemptions would indeed occur, it agreed with
the government’s valuation expert. At Koons’s
death, the redemption offers had been agreed to by
the children and constituted binding contracts. The
price could easily be determined because most of
14Those figures were raised in their notices of deficiency to
$64 million and $20 million, respectively.
15Its two operating companies constituted only 4 percent of
the LLC’s holdings.
16Reg. section 20.2053-3(a).
17Applying those discounts, the parties contended that the
values were, respectively, $109,651,854 and $148,503,609.
18Likewise, he said that even a 70.4 percent voting interest
after the redemption of the children’s interests could not receive
private benefits because of the limitations on asset distributions
and supermajority vote requirements for some decisions under
the LLC’s operating agreement and the stock purchase agree-
ment’s restrictions on dissolution and full asset distributions
until after January 10, 2012.
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the LLC’s assets were cash. The court observed that
under those circumstances, a state court would
have enforced the signed offer letters. Moreover,
because it was essential that the children no longer
own an interest in the LLC, a court would have
ordered specific performance. Although the taxpay-
ers contended that the children would not ulti-
mately go through with the sale, the court held that
the facts indicated the opposite: Both sides wanted
to effectuate the redemption agreement.
The court also agreed with the rest of the analysis
of the government’s expert. It found that the inter-
est should be considered a majority interest, with-
out a lack of control discount. The court accepted
the expert’s assumption that an LLC member with a
70.42 percent interest could by himself force the
company to sell most of its assets since the stock
purchase agreement only provided for the LLC to
retain $10 million in liquid assets and keep a
minimum net worth of $40 million until January 10,
2012. Regardless of the decedent’s expressed re-
quest that the LLC purchase operating businesses
after he died, hypothetical parties to a sale of the
trust’s interest in the LLC would know that the
interest carried with it the opportunity for a forced
sale of approximately $140 million in LLC assets.
Thus, the court considered $140 million the mini-
mum value of that interest.
The court dismissed criticisms of the report pre-
pared by the government’s expert, saying that it
suitably accounted for the stock purchase agree-
ment restrictions and the potential for a lawsuit.
The lawsuit, the court said, concerned the de-
cedent’s actions approximately 20 years earlier, was
brought a year after the decedent’s death, and was
ultimately dismissed as time barred. Moreover, the
court said that despite assertions to the contrary, the
government’s expert considered the transferability
restrictions but did so within the context of the
majority interest’s power over an extremely liquid
company. Thus, despite not applying a regression
analysis, the court found that the opinion of the
government’s expert was based on experience and
common sense. Moreover, the regression equation
formulated by the taxpayer’s expert was rooted in
data derived primarily from active businesses with
minority ownership interests, whereas the LLC
possessed only two small businesses and mostly
cash, and the trust’s interest was effectively a ma-
jority interest. Finally, the regression equation over-
estimated and incorrectly assigned valuation
discounts by tying them to the size of the block of
stock instead of the regulatory restraints.
Therefore, the court adopted the government’s
figure of $148,503,609 as the date-of-death value of
the revocable trust’s interest in CI LLC.
Black
The decedent in Black,19 a former Erie Indemnity
Co. employee, became the company’s second larg-
est shareholder. The decedent and his wife had one
son and two adult grandsons. The son had marital
problems, and his Erie stock, as his principal asset,
would be at risk in a divorce. The decedent’s
grandsons were unemployed and financially naïve.
The decedent had created trusts for them, funded
with Erie stock, and the son served as trustee. But
the trust’s term was ending. The decedent created a
family limited partnership to keep the trust from
selling the stock, which represented 13 to 14 percent
of the total Erie stock. He did that so the stock could
retain its power as the swing vote between the two
major factions of stockholders and for estate plan-
ning purposes. At that time, the decedent and his
wife held more than $4 million outside the FLP and
had sufficient income, ranging from around
$303,000 to $2.2 million annually, to cover their
expenses.
The FLP retained the Erie stock, along with some
real estate and shares in the decedent’s own insur-
ance company, until after the decedent’s death in
2001, at which time the FLP’s net asset value was
more than $315 million. At the decedent’s death, his
estate had enough cash assets to pay the estate tax
liability of about $1.7 million. However, his widow
died soon after him, and her assets were insufficient
to pay her administrative expenses and her estate
taxes.
Unsuccessful in borrowing elsewhere, the de-
cedent’s son, as executor of his mother’s estate,
contracted with the FLP to lend the estate $71
million, with interest and principal payable in full
not before November 30, 2007. Her estate took a
section 2053 deduction of $20,296,274 in interest
payments.
The Tax Court granted judgment in favor of the
estate on the section 2036 issue and held that the
decedent’s transfer of his Erie stock to the FLP fell
within the exception for a bona fide sale for ad-
equate and full consideration. However, the court
held that the FLP loan to the wife’s estate and to the
decedent’s revocable trust was unnecessary:
The only distinction between the loan scenario
and the partial redemption scenario is that the
former gave rise to an immediate estate tax
deduction for interest in excess of $20 mil-
lion. . . . That the loan scenario, like the partial
redemption scenario, required a sale of Erie
stock to discharge the debts of Mrs. Black’s
estate, i.e., that Erie stock was available and
19Estate of Black v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 340 (2009).
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actually used for that purpose, negates peti-
tioner’s contention that the loan was needed to
solve a ‘‘liquidity dilemma.’’20
Thus, while allowing deductions relating to a
secondary offering of the FLP’s Erie stock, the court
held that the wife’s estate could not deduct the
interest on the loan.
Analysis and Conclusion
As in Black, in which the estate had access to
sufficient liquid assets to pay the estate tax liability,
the court in Koons refused to allow the estate to
deduct interest on an unnecessary loan. In both
cases, but especially in Koons, the identities of the
lender and borrower, the estate’s access to liquid or
readily liquid assets, the length of the loan, and the
prohibition against prepayment all clearly indicated
that the reason for the loan was primarily to achieve
an estate tax deduction and not to assist in the
timely administration of the estate.
On the issue of the proper marketability discount
in Koons as between the taxpayers’ figure of a 31.7
percent discount and the government’s assertion of
a 7.5 percent discount, the court sustained the
government’s relatively small discount on the basis
that the facts indicated that the children’s redemp-
tion was essentially complete at the decedent’s
death. That conclusion led the court effectively to
ascribe to the decedent’s revocable trust a 70.42
percent voting interest in CI LLC. As the court said,
that majority interest would be sufficient to force
the LLC to sell most of its liquid assets, especially
since the stock purchase agreement required only a
relatively small retention of assets through January
10, 2012. Having made that finding and critical of
the taxpayers’ expert’s reliance on a study involving
companies holding operating businesses unlike the
passive CI LLC assets, the court reasonably adopted
the government’s 7.5 percent lack of marketability
discount.
20Id. at 384-385.
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